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Understanding The Recurrent Crisis In Legal
Romanticism: Two Criteria for Coherent Doubt
Chris Sagers*
Abstract
Broadly skeptical or relativistic criticisms of law and
legal discourse, of the kind prevalent in the last generation in
American legal scholarship, pose an inherent logic problem:
they tend to impugn normativity itself just as much as they do
their intended target. What seems amiss is that the act of
critique is itself normative. However it is stated, and
notwithstanding efforts by the critic to say otherwise, it is hard
to see how the normativity implied in the very act of critique-
indeed, in the very act of having purposes at all-is not at odds
with the critique itself
As an organizing theme, this paper observes a parallel
in the history ofa much more influential intellectual movement,
the "romantic" phase in nineteenth century literature. While
no one seems to have noticed the striking similarities between
that movement and our recent generation of legal iconoclasm,
the lesson is that the conflict latent in this work is destined to
lead only to ever more mystical, seemingly desperate efforts to
explain how one can be both a productive legal academic and
be a skeptic. As the romantic experience suggests, that cycle
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University; I welcome all
feedback at csagers@law.csuohio.edu. My special thanks to Tom Richardson,
Jim Sandman and Bruce Swartz, because karmic hygiene counsels one always to
do nice things for good people. No person spoke with me more about this paper
than Pierre Schlag, and despite the arguments I make here about his work I am
eager to avoid any misunderstanding over my own veneration for his work and
for his generosity. My thanks for feedback to Ben Barton, Barton Beebe, David
Gray Carlson, Jeanne Schroeder, Brian Tamanaha, Adam Thurschwell, Mark
Tushnet, and the junior faculty at Cardozo Law School. Thanks also for
feedback on earlier incarnations of this paper, so different that they probably
will not recognize it, to Ross Davies, Daniel Farber, Matt Frank, Jack Schlegel,
and Joseph Singer. Finally, thanks to my own colleagues for ongoing feedback
and exchange on these matters, especially the peerless and incomparable Jim
Wilson.
Incidentally, as a one-time would-be "bad boy" of legal scholarship, the
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sooner or later ends when plausibility is exhausted and the
winds of academic fashion turn elsewhere. But the more
central contribution of the paper is a technical one. It will
carefully model the internal logic conflict itself and then
devise a means logically to test whether various likely and
widely held scholarly purposes could, under this test, resolve
the conf lict. Ultimately, this paper is something of a confession
of one doubter that apparently there is no solution to this
conflict.
Hume, and other sceptical innovators, are vain men, and will
gratify themselves at any expense. . . . Truth, sir, is a cow
which will yield such people no more milk, and so they are
gone to milk the bull.
-Samuel Johnson
INTRODUCTION
It was apparently never much appreciated among those
brash legal iconoclasts who enjoyed so much attention in the last
forty years or so, nor among all we who shared their sympathies,
that latent at the heart of their project was an ancient logic
problem. At length it would cause the temporarily glamorous
project to fade from academic fashion and for the time being seem
to have been defeated. It is evidently not now appreciated by their
many critics that, sooner or later, they will be back. Lessons from
history suggest that while that ancient logic problem is a hard and
dispiriting one that causes doubtful movements periodically to
fade, they do not disappear. Revolutionary critique, on the one
hand, and received culture, on the other hand, are often conceived
as locked in a zero-sum struggle, and as a matter of academic fad
one or the other may seem at a given time to be in ascendency.
Somehow the struggle can be played out and forgotten fairly
quickly, and the fact that the recent struggle in law finds close
2
ancestors from so long ago will turn out to be quite telling.
1 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL's LIFE OF JOHNsON 314 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980)
(1763) (quoting Samuel Johnson).
2 This insight resembles in very small form that made by sociologist Randall
Collins in his massive world history of philosophy. He recounts the recurrence
of skeptical arguments throughout recorded history and in a variety of cultures,
and argues that they are a particular aspect of the process by which "critical
epistemologies" cyclically interact with ever more abstract metaphysics. See
RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF
INTELLECTUAL CHANGE 807-13 (1998).
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The ancient problem of logic is as follows. Skepticism-
the epistemological position that we do not or cannot know things
in an objective sense-or morally relative critiques, or other
approaches implying broad doubt of values, have a way of painting
themselves into a corner. In its simplest version, the logic conflict
is simply that one cannot assert as a matter of fact either that there
is no truth or that it is impossible to know things. Both statements
are self-contradictory.3 In that version the problem is easy to
evade-a person can be earth-scorchingly skeptical without
4
explicitly stating propositions whose truth is required. But even
more careful statements of doubt eventually tend to work
themselves back into the same problem, and one purpose here is to
show that that is indeed the case. When worked out to their logical
conclusions, they tend to cast doubt on normativity itself. The
problem then is that critique, by its nature, is itself normative.s
Legal philosophy must ask how one can be both a doubter and
continue to speak or write anything at all. More to the point, how
can one be both a doubter and a law professor, a person whose
vocation is normally thought to require evaluation of things? Here
is a cold, honest, and unflattering confession: though I have spent
more than ten years thinking about it, and despite my instinct that
it is not insoluble, I am afraid I do not know.6 Indeed, this paper
3 Aristotle observed this; the statements assert their own truth, an assertion that
the statements themselves say cannot be made. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS,
bk. I , ch. 4, at 59-64 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., Peripatetic Press 1979).
4 While epistemological skeptics seem to assert that "we cannot know anything,"
and therefore to refute themselves, they need not make that strong claim just to
be skeptical. The skeptic can just claim that "it seems like I do not know
anything for sure," and, after all, de gustibus non est disputandum. See
Christopher L. Sagers, Waiting With Brother Thomas, 46 UCLA L. REV. 461,
462 n.3, 484-86 (1998) [hereinafter Sagers, Waiting]. The ancient skeptics,
following Pyrrho of Elis, made this argument at great length, claiming that their
only purpose was to retreat to the calm of an inner state of refusal to decide
anything at all (the state of "epoche" or tnoxit). See SEXTUS EMPIRICUs,
OUTLINES OF SKEPTICISM 10 (Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1994); JONATHAN BARNES, THE TOILS OF SCEPTICISM 8-9 (1990)
(explaining the use of gnofi in Sextus and ancient skepticism).
Still, it turns out the even the totally Pyrrhonian skeptic has an internal
logic conflict like other doubters; it just takes a more elaborate argument to see
why. See infra Part IV(9).
5 See Christopher L. Sagers, Student Book Review, Postmodern Legal
Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End By Gary Minda, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1938-42 (1997) (critical of Minda for failure even to
acknowledge the normativity ironically implied in his book). See also Arthur
Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L. J. 1229 (1979).
6 James Boyle put it this way: "[T]he trouble with confronting really hard
problems is that you probably won't be able to solve them. As different drafts of
2010]1 3
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resurrects the tortured palimpsest of an optimistic manuscript on
the question called Cum Grano Salis, later scaled back in
ambition and renamed The Identity of Moral and Legal Criticism,8
neither of which saw the light of day, and the successive drafts of
which seemed like ever more strained efforts to explain something
to myself that I did not understand.
Thus, rather than produce yet another struggling,
unconvincing effort to solve the conflict between doubt and
normativity, I will offer two ideas that I think are more valuable.
This first is a surprising and overlooked lesson from history, and a
bit of a sociology of the working of doubt over time. It so happens
that latter-day legal doubters have found themselves stuck in the
same unresolved struggle that caused an earlier and more
important cultural movement to dissipate as an independent force,
the European literary and cultural phenomenon known as
romanticism.9 Building on this insight, this essay's organizing
theme is that if our recent legal iconoclasms have perhaps
sputtered out for a time, there is a historical example to help
explain why, and to suggest that they will return. The example of
the Romantics also nicely corroborates one of the major arguments
made in this paper: that the logic problem is a problem for all kinds
of doubters, even if they avoid technical skepticism or outright
critique of normativity. Most of the Romantics did not seem
concerned with technical questions of that nature, and yet wound
up in just the same conflict as epistemological skeptics.
Second, I will offer my confession that, apparently, that
struggle cannot be overcome. Here will arise what I hope is an
this article accumulated, I revised my aspirations downward to meet my
performance so many times that I began to feel like a defense contractor." James
Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 493, 496 (1999).
7 Christopher L. Sagers, Cum Grano Salis (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author).
8 Christopher L. Sagers, The Identity of Moral and Legal Criticism (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
9 To be clear, I will not try to prove that any present-day legal philosopher is a
Romantic. Claims have been made that a huge number of divergent and
conflicting philosophic or literary movements were "romantic." But as Arthur
Lovejoy pointed out long ago, if all these very different things are romantic,
then the word means nothing at all. See Arthur 0. Lovejoy, On the
Discrimination ofRomanticisms, 39 PUBS. MOD. LANG. AssN. 229, 232 (1924).
What is more important is the fact that today's legal iconoclasm has
worked itself through the same ultimately exhausting trauma as did the
Romantics, and I think for the same reason: because at the heart of our
philosophy are commitments at odds with the normativity ineluctably inherent in
our purpose as scholars.
4 [March
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even more valuable contribution. The paper will carefully model
the internal logic conflict itself, and then devise a means logically
to test whether various likely and widely held scholarly purposes
could, under this test, resolve the conflict.
Before going any further, though, the following is
necessary to avoid confusion: I do not believe that my own
inability to solve this logic conflict proves anything about doubt
itself. Any such claim would itself be illogical, and would just
restate the feeble reductio ad absurdum with which skepticism is
routinely attacked. 0 My own doubtful instincts persist unabated.
If my surrender proves anything, it is only that the logic conflict
will ultimately have to be reconceived or approached in some way
other than the one presented here.
The problem of the normativity of doubt has been observed
elsewhere. In law, critics of doubt have frequently made a point of
it, arguing that it makes doubt itself internally inconsistent, that it
is belied by the way that doubters actually live, 12 and that the harm
10 A work like this probably had to be written by someone who actually cares
about this scholarship. External critiques are often written by persons who find
skepticism so preposterous that they remain fixated on simplistic arguments and
do not give serious thought to arguments that could actually be troubling to the
doubter. Accordingly, most criticism in the legal literature comprises no more
than arguments that all boil down to a reductio ad absurdum, in roughly the
following form: "Skepticism would leave us in a state of nihilisim [or some
other seemingly undesirable position], and therefore must be wrong." To some
this point of view has an instinctive appeal, but it turns out to be illogical. Other
typical arguments are really just more or less sophisticated restatements of
claims like "well, it just seems to me like I know things" or "I just know what's
right and wrong." For a collection of these and other such arguments, and more
extensive thoughts about them, see Sagers, Waiting, supra note 4, at 480-91.
"1 See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 577, 577-83 (1991) (arguing that postmodernism cannot be a useful
legal philosophy because its basic tenets are contrary to theory-building);
Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989) (arguing that the new doubtful
scholarship has prematurely interred metaphysics); Dennis Patterson, The
Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal
Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (arguing that doubt leads to an infinite
regress of interpretations and ultimately leads to "a philosophical hall of
mirrors" or a "seriously false and misleading picture of the law.").
12 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 84-85 (1986):
[The doubter] cannot reserve his skepticism for some quiet
philosophical moment, and press his own opinions about the
morality of slavery, for example, . . . when he is off duty and
only acting in the ordinary way. He has given up his
distinction between ordinary and objective opinions; if he
really believes . . . that no moral judgment is really better than
HeinOnline  -- 2 Wash. U. Jurisprudence Rev. 5 2010
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done to normativity is actually dangerous.' 3 Legal doubters are
aware of the conflict,14 and some have tried to offer solutions to
it.15 Commentators are also aware that even in law, it is not new;
though it goes persistently unresolved, the problem is old.16
The paper proceeds in five parts, which successively lay
out an explanation of the problem itself, the legal work to which I
think it applies, and then, for context, a practical example of a
particular legal scholar whose writings are widely cited and appear
to remain influential, but seem the poorer for failure to address the
problem.' 7 The paper's intellectual heart, however, is in Part IV.
any other, he cannot then add that in his opinion slavery is
unjust.
See also Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 277, 310 (1985) ("[Doubters suffer from] a kind of conceptual
schizophrenia: when writing they propound subjectivist epistemology, but when
it comes to daily living they make judgments and decisions as we all do:
presupposing the existence of tables, chairs, and right answers to hard moral
dilemmas and legal cases.").
13 See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
METHOD OF THE LAW 316 (1940) (cautioning that the skepticism of the legal
realists could lead to totalitarianism); Morris Cohen, On Absolutisms in Legal
Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 681, 691 (1936) (criticizing legal realists for
"nihilistic absolutism"); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 10 (1986) (arguing that CLS destroys without providing a replacement
for what it has destroyed and is thus "politically unappealing and politically
irresponsible").
14 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal
Studies, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992) [hereinafter Fischl, The Question];
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 174 n. 18
(1990) [hereinafter Schlag, Nowhere to Go].
1 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. I (1984).
16 That it is an old one in law perhaps reflects the timelessly problematic nature
of legal administration. Cf A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal
Ideals, 58 U. CINN. L. REV. 819, 830-31 (1990) (arguing that "iconoclasm"
unites skeptical legal philosophies, despite their changing methodologies and
jargon over time, and identifying evidence of it as early as 1345). But indeed, it
is an old one everywhere, see infra Part IV(9), which is unsurprising in that it is
not a legal problem as such, and rather is a basic existential dilemma.
17 The exemplar I chose-Pierre Schlag-will probably make some people roll
their eyes a little bit. But, while I don't think I am exactly an Agent of
P.I.E.R.R.E., see Keith Aoki, P.I.E.R.R.E. and the Agents ofR.E.A.S.O.N., 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 743, 746 (2003) (a comic strip, no less), there are several reasons
that this choice makes sense. First, Schlag appears to lack faith as much as a
person possibly could in knowing. Second, he appears deliberately to have
remained apolitical. Finally, he has explicitly faced the problems of normativity
latent in his work and wrestled with them at some length.
The analysis here may also be of use in that Schlag's work is still
widely cited, but has not been the focus of much sustained analysis. Prior to a
[March6
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That Part sets out a list of possible solutions to the inner logic
problem of broadly skeptical or relativistic critique-in effect, a
series of possible purposes that the critical author could take as his
own without invoking a conflict with his own critical
commitments. Ultimately, none of them are satisfying, as I believe
that they each fail to meet one or the other of two simple
requirements. Namely, for methodological reasons that I will
explain in Part 1, the doubter should be able to state a purpose for
his work that: (1) is not in conflict with his own criticism, and (2)
does not require that he not care whether his statement of his views
is "true" or has some other value. It turns out that the list in Part IV
is the best evidence that our recent iconoclastic legal scholarship is
really just a latter-day romanticism: as was the case for the
Romantics themselves, as one continues along this list from one
solution to the next, it is as if one is climbing a ladder toward ever
more lyrical, mystical solutions, until one can hardly find any
resolution except utterly inert quietude. Tellingly, presenting the
list in increasing order of compliance with the two desiderata
above-making it easier for the doubter to avoid conflict with his
purposes and to care about the value of his criticisms-also turns
out to put them in order of increasingly mystical, magical lyricism.
Alas, then, with little else to say, Part V provides some
brief closing remarks. And a farewell.18
I. THE PROBLEM: PROPOSITIONS INHERENT IN ACTION OR
AFFIRMATION
Capturing what I claim to be the ancient logic problem
entails one bit of probably contentious analytical philosophy or
psychology. As mentioned, working through this one technical
issue, and devising a test from it to evaluate doubtful philosophical
positions, will be a main contribution of this essay.
The problem as I conceive it is that doubters suffer a
conflict between propositions that seem implied by things that they
do or say, on the one hand, and the content of their statements, on
the other hand. Specifically, the act of critique itself-indeed, the
2003 festschrift in the University of Miami Law Review the only sustained
survey of Schlag's work appears to have been David Gray Carlson, Duellism in
Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1937 (1999).
18 Do not worry. I am not going to pull a Roquentin. Cf infra note 97-98 and
accompanying text. I am also not really going to pull much of a Rodell, because
I do not want to. See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38
(1936); infra Part V. Actually, even Rodell did not completely pull a Rodell. See
Fred Rodell, Goodby to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962).
2010] 7
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mere fact of being, in any state other than inert quietude-seems to
imply commitment to some proposition that is ineluctably
normative, or at least affirmative. The reason this instinct is
probably contentious is that, admittedly, it is not logically
necessary that an action is itself the statement of a proposition, or
even evidence of a person's belief in a proposition. Stating the
issue in that way begs the question whether people even have
purposes or know what their purposes are before they act.
The problem can be avoided by a more precise statement of
the goal of this essay. First, I propose that it is an appropriate
philosophical question whether my own purposes are consistent
with my own criticisms. It is appropriate at least if a study of the
resulting inner conflicts could yield generalizable insights. So,
regardless of whether it could be said that a person must hold a
given purpose as a logical necessity, I begin by asserting that I, a
person with doubtful philosophical instincts, do in fact have
purposes. Second, I believe that this fact can be logically
generalized. Even if I cannot state that every person who writes or
speaks has a given purpose, it remains useful to ask whether
doubtful criticisms are logically at odds with commitments that are
in fact widely held, or that would be if critics more commonly
examined their own purposes. Finally, the question of which
purposes are widely held is an empirical one, and one that I cannot
answer. So, as an alternative, I will hypothesize a series of what
seem like likely purposes-the list of purposes that appears in Part
IV, below-and I will then test them. Importantly, I am not strictly
interested in whether a given purpose is merely logically consistent
with doubt. It would be logical for a person to state philosophical
positions that he actually believes are false, if his purpose is to lie.
So to generalize the test in a way that is more useful, I propose that
any purpose that might be a likely one for the doubter should be
tested against the following two criteria:
(1) the purpose should not conflict with the doubter's
own criticisms, and
(2) it should not require that he not care whether the
content of his philosophy is "true" or has some
other value (including by rendering it unimportant
or innocuous).
The second criterion needs one clarification. Some
approaches to solving the doubter's logical conflict really just
make the initial doubt itself seem unimportant. They begin by
claiming that, indeed, we cannot know things, and objective
[March8
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knowledge is highly suspect. But they then say we can proceed
pretty much as before by using some second-best proxy for
knowledge. This is a conflict in violation of the second criterion.
As will be seen below, for this reason the effort just does not really
work.19
In effect the approach in this essay hypothesizes an ideal
"doubting person," like the "rational person" of economics or the
"reasonable person" of tort law, and asks what the ideal doubting
person could take as a purpose. Admittedly, it skirts the empirical
psychological issue of how people actually have and experience
purposes, but it does this for the sake of explanatory power.
Finally, it bears observing again that while the question being
asked, strictly speaking, is the fairly narrow one of why state a
critical proposition, the deeper question is really existential. The
question asked is really why do anything at all, or even more
fundamentally, what is the reason for being?
An awkward problem is to say to what legal philosophy
this logic problem applies, because it could apply to different kinds
of arguments. That is, different kinds of arguments about law state
or imply propositions that might be illogical because of this
problem. It would in particular be wrong to impute it to "schools"
with colloquial labels, like critical legal studies ("CLS"),
postmodernism, post-structuralism, or pragmatism.2 Most
obviously, the logic conflict confronts those who explicitly state
technical skepticism (that is, any epistemological position that
knowledge is to some greater or lesser extent beyond human
capacity). However, it also applies to any explicit moral relativism
or cultural critique that tends to impugn normativity as such. A
critical legal philosopher may or may not explicitly state a
'9 See infra Part IV(2). Brian Tamanaha pointed out what may seem to be a
logical weakness in the argument of this Part II. It may not actually be possible
to engage in inaction, particularly if one takes Sartre's view that a deliberate
decision not to choose is itself a choice. If so, then it is not true that action
necessarily implies a purpose. For the sake of clarity, I have tried to emphasize
in the text why I think my test is a worthwhile exercise even though it plainly is
correct that action does not logically prove purpose. In the alternative, Professor
Tamanaha observes that a person could act with no commitments-such a
person might be the true "ironist." But as I suggest in Parts IV(5) and IV(6)
below, I think that a motive like that would fail or at least pose a serious tension
under the second element of my test-it would require that the content of the
doubter's views do not themselves have any value.
20 For example, many writers commonly associated with CLS have advocated
social change or otherwise stated their views without openly skeptical or
relativistic critique. See, e.g.,William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing ofPolitics in
the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEG. EDUC. 175 (2001) (arguing that law and politics
are inseparable, but that such a state of affairs is to be desired).
2010] 9
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skeptical epistemology or a moral relativism. But her approach to
uncovering injustice hidden within legal concepts will ordinarily
involve a demonstration of the epistemological or metaphysical
inadequacies that afflict legal rules. As has been observed, those
inadequacies turn out not to be limited only to legal concepts, and
make it hard for CLS scholars to articulate different avenues to
justice that do not conflict with that same critique.21 For example,
in the past few decades this kind of critique has often invoked the
Derridean attack on "privileged perspectives." To take one well
known example that is also important to this essay, Pierre Schlag
once attacked the "stabilized, situated perspective" from which any
"normative legal thought" proceeds, and argued that once such a
perspective is no longer "privileg[ed]," then "the specific
deployments of [its] distinctions" are no longer "experienced as
valid."22 The making of that observation implies at a minimum that
the observation itself has value-that it deserves to be made, that it
is important. But that judgment, in turn, implies a privileged
perspective. It implies that the logical error made by normative
legal scholars-their failure to realize that their prescriptions
require a logically indefensible privilege for an otherwise unproven
normative commitment-is bad. It therefore asserts that illogic is
bad and should be exposed, but does not prove that normative
commitment except by (illogically) relying on a sense of
obviousness. One reply might be that observing illogic is just
aesthetic, and therefore needs no more justification than art.2 3 But
aside from the fact that few philosophers seriously consider
themselves only artists, and fairly constantly state or imply
propositions seriously at odds with doing just art, art does need
24
some justification in my very attenuated sense.
21 See Fishl, The Question, supra note 14, at 781-82 (critiquing MARK KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)); see also Fiss, supra note 13, at
9-10; Singer, supra note 15.
22 Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801,
824, 828 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, Normativity].
23 Schlag makes this argument. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
24 At the time he wrote the argument quoted above, Schlag replied to just this
criticism. See Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1059 (1991). But his
reply seems not to deny that there is an internal logic conflict. He said that by
adopting "the logic of stance-the very same metaphorical logic that prompts
the question of privilege," his critics had "short-circuit[][ed]" interesting
questions about the nature of the subject, and had "frustrate[][d] the . . . project
of dialogical openness." Id. at 1061. He implied that there could be
"jurisprudences that operate differently"-that do not require the taking of
stances, id at 1062, but his only indication of what they would be is that they
would seek "to reveal how the scene of (normatively charged) stances is itself
[March10
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The same logic problem affects broad critiques of law that
wear formally different clothing. Pragmatists intend to preserve
their own power to distinguish between better and worse courses of
action, and generally to rise above nihilism. Even so, since they
begin their demand for pragmatic, context-specific problem-
solving with an epistemology scathingly skeptical of theory and
distinctions, they find they have a lot of trouble even stating their
25philosophy without contradicting their own premises. A race
theorist or a cultural anthropologist might insist on a "cultural
relativism" or "multiculturalism," so as to allow different peoples
to be valued without discrimination. The theorist pretty quickly
seems forced to give equal dignity to seemingly very bad ideas,
including some directly hostile to the very reasons for theorizing
about race or culture.
Above all, the problem can be implied in places where it is
not intended and may not be obvious. Legal theory and scholarship
is almost inevitably normative because of the inescapably
normative nature of its subject matter. Therefore, a broad criticism
of law or of theory about law, implying that it is missing some
necessary predicate or rests on some prior commitment that is
irremediably deficient, will be very hard to contain so that it does
not amount to a critique of normativity as such. In any case, there
is no reason that the logic problem is limited only to critiques of
law. Generally, even where it is not intended, any broad skepticism
or critique of intellectual effort usually has immanent within it the
seeds of strong epistemological critique of normativity. This is so
even though it may be stated as a critique of language or culture. If
it broadly impugns the ability of those tools to lead to objectively
knowable propositions, it implies the same consequences as
skeptical epistemology and risks the same logical defect. In fact, I
believe that all of these positions can be converted directly into
epistemological skepticism, as they are only semantically distinct
from it.26
constructed," id. But does not seeking to reveal something imply that it is
valuable to seek to reveal something?
2' This problem is explained in detail in Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism and
Public-Private in the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEv. STATE L. REV.
219, 223-24 & n.18 (2006), Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100
YALE L. J. 409 (1990), and Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can
Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.
J. 687 (2003).
26 Though it is really a point for another day, I believe that such distinctions-
between systematic epistemological and metaphysical critique-are actually
only semantic. Indeed, I wonder how epistemology is ever more than
semantically distinct from metaphysics or ontology, since every proposition of
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Again, the conflict is more than just a problem of method
for the scholar, because it is more than just a problem inhering in
writing or speaking philosophical positions. It is a problem posed
by the very fact of having a purpose. Accordingly, the* truly
recurrent crisis, which we can expect to see repeated, is a central
existential one: if action by its nature implies purposes undermined
by skepticism, but one nonetheless feels compelled by skeptical
instincts, then one must try to reconcile the having of a purpose
with the bleak nihilism that seems to follow skeptical critique
(taken to its logical extreme). In other words, the central question
in this paper, and the one driving the apparent demise both of the
Romantics and latter-day legal iconoclasts, is no less than this:
why exist?
Incidentally, a fair criticism is that it seems artificial to
limit this essay's concern to legal philosophy. I will say in my
defense only that, to this extent, I take an important legal literature
as I have found it. Broadly skeptical critiques of law themselves
very quickly lead one into purely abstract epistemological or
cultural criticism. This has led some legal iconoclasts to attempt
whole new foundational schools of thought or expansive
psychological models that purport to capture the understanding or
"doing" of law. Though these efforts normally purport to be meta-
critique relevant only to legal scholarship, there is no obvious
reason for their limitation to it.2 7
In any case, for the sake of convenience, hereinafter I will
call this logic conflict "The Problem."
II. MODELING LEGAL ROMANTICISM
So why have I said that this scholarship and its inner
conflict echo romanticism?
I hope I will not be too remiss in not duplicating here some
long exegesis on the literary and philosophical movement loosely
known by that name; I think it should suffice to invoke the large
secondary literature on the topic. Instead, I want to highlight main
metaphysics seems to beg a question of epistemology. At least if one has any
doubts about knowledge, I wonder if there really is any difference between
asking "does X exist?" and asking "can I know whether X exists?" Pace Plato,
incidentally, and 2500 years of footnotes. Cf PLATO, THEATETUS 9 (Robin A.H.
Waterfield trans., 1987) (preface; noting, with evident veneration, that
"Theaetetus establishes the study of knowledge as a branch of philosophy in its
own right distinct from, especially, ontology.").
27 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REV.
1047 (2002) [hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics].
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themes, and in particular to set out those most illuminating
parallels to latter-day legal iconoclasm. That the movement's name
is difficult to define-indeed, that "movement" is the wrong word,
and really should be replaced by "constructed artifact of
convenience among cultural historians"-is well known.28 Also
commonly said is that "romantic" characterizes a wide collection
of philosophers, historians, poets and artists, whose work
collectively contributed to a turn in the development of the modern
intellectual world of the West. It is sometimes even said that our
present-day sensibilities really remain "romantic," to some
extent.29
Though it is probably misleading to some extent to say so,
romanticism was in many ways in reaction to Enlightenment
rationality.30 The Romantics were generally fascinated with the
organic and the natural over the urban and the rational; by
Gemeinschaft over-rationalized, "artificial" associations; by an
opposition to analytical conceptual thought;3' by the exaltation of
28 As one observer stated, "[t]he idea of [r]omanticism is at once indispensable
and embarrassing to cultural historians. They cannot do without it[,] . . . [b]ut
they are acutely worried by the problem of defining it." Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton,
Philosophical Romanticism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 778
(Ted Honderich ed., 1995). There is also Arthur Lovejoy's famous view: "[t]he
word 'romantic' has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means
nothing." Lovejoy, supra note 9, at 232.
29 IsAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 1-2 (1965) ("[R]omanticism ...
is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the
Western world. It seems to me to be the greatest single shift in the consciousness
of the West that has occurred, and all the other shifts which have occurred in the
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear to me in comparison less
important, and at any rate deeply influenced by it."); BERTRAND RUSSELL, A
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 682 (1945) ("Revolt of solitary instincts
against social bonds is the key to the philosophy, the politics, and the
sentiments, not only of what is commonly called the romantic movement, but of
its progeny down to the present day."); see also BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH
OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1994) (discussing the rise of individualism and its significance on a
world scale, circa 1800, a phenomenon associated with romantic rhetoric).
30 However misleading it may be, though, it is probably in their enemies that the
Romantics were the most unified. As has been said, "[i]n the case of a
movement in ideas . . . consensus is most easily discovered in what the
individuals involved were all against. What they were all for is harder to get at."
Franklin L. Baumer, Romanticism (ca. 1780-ca. 1830), in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 198-204 (Philip P. Wiener, ed. 1974). Moreover, as Baumer
says, "the big story is that the various wings of the romantic movement
developed largely independently of one another, out of native impulses, but
also-otherwise there would be no consensus-in reaction against a body of
ideas common in certain respects to them all." Id.
31 As Wordsworth said, "to dissect is to murder." BERLIN, supra note 29, at 120.
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the individual and self-actualization, an ideal inevitably at odds
with universal morality; and by the significance of artistic genius,
at the expense of le philosophe.32 It does not imply a technical
"skepticism" of a Pyrrhonian or Academic variety, and indeed
most philosophical Romantics were confident of their ability to
derive important metaphysical abstractions through reason
grounded in a priori premises.3 3  But basic commitments
commonly thought to be romantic nonetheless were inherently at
odds with systematic normativity, and indeed, with system itself.
Romantics exalted the liberation of the individual, especially the
idealized "genius" of unbridled artistic creativity, for it is through
that person that the Infinite is revealed. Within such a strong
individualism, values were precisely what men created for
themselves, and therefore there could be room for neither universal
moral norms nor received aesthetic constraints.34 At its extremes,
romanticism stood for the view that there is no rational structure in
reality at all.
And there is the rub. However moving those individualistic
passions may have been-and indeed, however important they
may have been in the origins of the modem self and modem liberal
institutions3 5-they immediately opened the raw need to find some
alternative means by which to understand, without reverting to all
that the Romantics had rejected. Most tellingly, their solutions
32 See generally BERLIN, supra note 27; see also 7 FREDERICK COPLESTONE,
S.J., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1-21 (Image Books reprint ed. 1994) (1963);
MORSE PECKHAM, BEYOND THE TRAGIC VISION: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962); RUSSELL, supra note 29, at 675-84; Baumer,
supra note 30, at 199. Quinton, supra note 28, at 778.
3 Notably, those significant philosophers most commonly associated with
romanticism, the post-Kantian German idealists, began by developing their
central concept of "absolute thought," "absolute ego" or "infinite spirit," a
transcendental, supra-individual, often seemingly god-like metaphysical
phenomenon by which ultimately to derive a systematic explanation of the
structure of reality. In one form or another, they captured that reality as the self-
unfolding of absolute reason; it could be understood as reality becoming aware
of itself through reflection upon itself by one of its own manifestations, human
awareness. In other words, the universe comes to know itself through the mind
of man. See COPLESTON, supra note 32, at 3-9.
34 William Blake's declaration is emblematic:
"I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another man's;
I will not Reason & Compare: my business is to Create."
WILLIAM BLAKE, JERUSALEM, ch.1, plate 10 (1804); see also BERLIN, supra
note 29, at 118-20.
3 See generally SHAIN, supra note 29.
36 See BERLIN, supra note 29, at 121-22.
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tended to become ever more mystical, spiritual and, seemingly,
desperate. To a reader of the recent generation of legal iconoclasm,
romanticism's most familiar trait is this escalation into essentially
spiritual efforts to resolve the conflict (or to explain how it could
be left tolerably unresolved), along with its tendency to spin out
ever more wildly assertive and absolute empirical assertions about
man's nature and place in reality.37
Again, it is awkward to say that this same cycle played out
within particular philosophies, and especially to try to attribute it to
colloquially named schools. I will observe only that in that frenetic
burst of critical literature beginning in the 1960s and reaching its
feverish heyday probably between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s, it came ever more clearly to be seen that logically
necessitated in its nature was a strong skepticism or an iconoclasm
otherwise leading to moral or epistemological relativism.38 at
these works share, and what perhaps they inherited from the
nineteenth century, is a struggle against rationalized knowledge,
against analytically dissectable science of the social or human.
Such knowledge was thought to be hostile and stifling to the nature
of man, who rather is passionate and organic and must be allowed
to thrive in the irrational.
III. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE
As a practical example I have chosen the work of Pierre
Schlag. I believe his work contains The Problem I have
described. 39 The choice is useful because, though he does not say
3 See, e.g., id. at 120, arguing that, according to the Romantics:
[w]henever you try to understand anything, by whatever
powers you have, you will discover . . . that what you are
pursuing is inexhaustible, that you are trying to catch the
uncatchable, that you are trying to apply a formula to
something which evades your formula, because wherever you
try to nail it down, new abysses open, and these abysses open
to yet other abysses."
See also COPLESTONE, supra note 32, at 19-21.
38 Reaching a culmination of sorts in Symposium: The Critique of Normativity,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991).
39 I am not the first to notice. See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1937 ("Is it not a
norm that one should not be normative?") (alteration in original). Professor
Carlson's paper was one of the few thoughtful critiques of Schlag's work prior
to a University of Miami symposium in 2003.
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so himself, most of his work appears to be deliberately apolitical.'4
If even a consciously apolitical argument suffers from the internal
logic problem I observe, then perhaps it is true that no broadly
doubtful critique can escape it.4 1
A. Schlag in Substance: The Metaphysical Critique
Schlag does not present his work as a generalizable
system.42 For present purposes I think that we can focus on one
particular line of his argument, which happily is quite intriguing,
and also happens to be the most plainly apolitical: his critique of
the metaphysics implied by discussions of legal doctrine. For
convenience I will refer to this as Schlag's "metaphysical critique."
Schlag has identified the following question as a main
inquiry: "[w]hen legal thinkers ascribe meaning or consequences to
authoritative legal sources," like constitutions, statutes, or judicial
precedent, "just what are they talking about?" 43 He says that in
answering this question, and in "attempt[ing] to cast [law] in the
form of science[]," the characterization of law by practitioners,
judges, and academics has been "aesthetically organized around a
fundamental ontology of reifications and animisms.""
4 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason, 57
U. MIAMI L. REv. 513, 513 (2003) (describing Schlag as "vigorously
refus(][ing] not just political correctness but all concession to our desire that
enlightenment should be politically edifying.").
4 1 The analysis is not strictly a criticism of Schlag's work. There might be a
small logical problem in trying to make it a criticism; as Schlag said at a 2003
symposium on his works, it is not really fair to fault an argument for failure to
do everything. He says his critics usually focus not on errors in what he has said
but on what he fails to say. See Pierre Schlag, A Reply-The Missing Portion, 57
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1029, 1029-30 (2003) (taking to task "the sometimes implicit,
sometimes explicit claim that the failure to include someone's favorite
[unattended-to issue] in my account compromises what I have done."). But my
view is that no matter what he says or does not say, a legal doubter cannot avoid
The Problem, and Schlag is only an example.
42 At least until recently. Cf Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27 (setting out a
systematic structure of different "aesthetics" by which to characterize the
psychological process by which legal actors understand legal phenomena;
apparently summarizing systematically his previous work on point). Even if it is
possible to construct a "linear Pierre" from his various non-linear observations,
see Kennedy, supra note 40 at 515 (purporting to do so), and Carlson, supra
note 17 , at 1911 (distilling a "four-point thesis" from all of Schlag's work),
which is unnecessary here.
43 Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.YU. L. REv 1681, 1697-98 (1996)
(hereinafter Schlag, Hiding the Ball] (italics omitted).
Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 877 (1997)
[hereinafter Schlag, Phrenology].
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This in itself is not self-evidently bad. We employ many
hypothesized non-real entities as a matter of convenience. This
seems true of tautological mathematical propositions, for example;
every signifier contained in the proposition "2 + 2 = 4" has only an
imaginary signified, but the proposition is still practically useful.
Because we have trouble generally talking about intangible things,
our language is more full of ontological metaphors than we are
normally aware. Regardless of whether or not it poses problems in
other contexts, this way of thinking is problematic when one is
thinking about law. Though Schlag is not especially explicit about
it, I take him to mean that in law we expect hypothesized entities-
"authoritative legal sources"-to do things, to be performative. In
particular, we expect them to constrain or guide application. Thus,
in law, hypothesized, intangible ontological entities are used as
part of an "unthinking transformation of classifications designed to
describe . . . into effective ontological agencies . . . ."45 This can
also be described as "[a] transposition from epistemic heuristics to
ontological actualities.,46 This eptistemic-to-ontological
transformation occurs through three conflations, which Schlag says
happen concurrently. First, classifications are "transubstantiated
into robust ontological entities that are part of the world to be
explained." 4 7 These hypothesized entities are then "reified: they
become determinate object-forms with stabilized identities."
Finally, they become ontological agencies, rather than mere
objects. "[T]hey are endowed with animistic properties. They
[thus] become capable of producing behaviors, actions, and the
like."49
It is this epistemic-to-ontological transformation that causes
the trouble. Because they are not only imaginary, but also have no
"stabilized referent," "all manner of complex relations [can] be
established among" the ontological agencies that are employed in
law, with the result that "virtually anything could be said about
how they [are] related to each other."50 Such agencies thus become
"super-full objects," in that they are "composite[s] of a variety of
attributes, many of which are contradictory or mutually
repellent."51  In other words, this transformation causes
authoritative legal sources-the Constitution, for example-to be




49 1d. at 889.
50 Id.
' Schlag, Hiding the Ball, supra note 43, at 1704-05.
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"capacious," such that "they serve as hosts for a great number of
(often conflicting) cognizable legal meanings." 52 Thus, we in our
professional culture have the everyday habit of speaking of
something as natural and simple, when in fact it is complex and
problematic.
B. Is Pierre Schlag a Normativo ?53
So is Schlag's work normatively problematic? In a sense,
Schlag has in some areas of his work directly attacked normativity
itself-he has stated a strong, explicit moral skepticism.5 4 But his
metaphysical critique is not itself logically a criticism of
evaluation. It is either or both a criticism of a way of making
government decisions, and of a way of talking about a behavior.
Even if his normative critique raises The Problem, his
metaphysical critique might be severable, to stand on its own and
be logically tested on its own merits. It is more useful to do that
here because the question is whether a person can state any broadly
doubtful position without invoking The Problem. If a doubtful
argument containing no explicit moral commitments invokes The
Problem, then maybe they all do.
In fairness we should give Schlag a chance to explain his
own normative commitments, if he has them. I believe that the
closest he has come to stating his purpose, at least in any careful
manner, are two very similar statements, one fairly old and one
quite recent. Twenty years ago he wrote that "[m]y effort here, as
elsewhere, is to try to displace, decenter, and weaken this system
of normative legal thought."ss He did not explain why that was his
purpose, but in a more recent observation he deepened the insight.
"Mine is itself an aesthetic project," he wrote, "an attempt to
awaken in the reader a sensitivity for and a recognition of the
different aesthetics of law."5 6 Though strictly speaking the latter
was offered only as an explanation of the paper in question, I take
it that he would be satisfied with this as a purpose for his writings
overall. He made fairly clear that it was a basically altruistic,
humanistic purpose. He said: "[my] project will be successful to
"1d. at 1681.
5 He once was, apparently, but says he gave it up. See Schlag, Nowhere to Go,
supra note 14, at 168-69.
- This was as explained above at note 22 and accompanying text. Again, he
seems to have denied that he actually took a position of moral skepticism, but it
is very hard to see how exactly he avoided it as the necessary consequence of his
critique of privileged positions.
" Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18.
56 Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1054.
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the extent it enables the reader to recognize the various aesthetics
of law and their influence on law and legal professionals-
including most especially herself or himself."5 7
As a defense to The Problem this argument just begs a
normative question: you can desire to "awaken
sensitivit[ies]"5 8 if you like, but why do that?
There is other evidence of Schlag's normative animus. A
lot of it is apparently quite superficial; it looks like normativity, but
perhaps only on the surface. First of all, his prose is laced with the
language of judgment, as in the tone of his critique of law and legal
culture,59 his apparent concern with the "violence" of law, 60 and
57 Id.
58 id.
5 This is in part through his depictions of ugliness in law, which seemingly
conveys that something must be "wrong" or "bad" by the human emotions that
ugliness invokes. For example, he is bothered by "the fancy corporate law office
on the thirty-eighth floor, where the ethereal, perfectly typed words of
impeccably dressed attorneys produce highly mediated, largely unseen effects
on the messy flesh of humanity below." Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at
1061; see also Schlag, Normativity, supra note 22, at 805 ("the cherished
'ideals' of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and
maintenance of precisely those ugly 'realities' of legal practice the academy so
routinely condemns.").
More generally, Schlag often writes about law and legal culture in
harshly disparaging language. He finds mainstream legal scholarship "pseudo-
science" and "nonsense [rendered] plausible." Schlag, Phrenology, supra note
44, at 910, 918. It is often so "utterly unconvincing" and "vacuous" that it must
be argued with "sufficient self-righteousness, pomposity, pseudo-sophistication,
or status in institutional affiliation" that "no one will notice." Schlag, Nowhere
to Go, supra note 14, at 170. In the end, it is "not simply that normative legal
thought is coercive and boring, but also ineffectual and (ironically) aimless."
Schlag, Normativity, supra note 22, at 851 n.133 (emphasis in original). The law
is no better. Because there is "no 'there there,"' legal practice "must be faked,
bluffed or simulated." PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 13
(1998) [hereinafter SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT]. Presumably that is why the
"empirical, aesthetic, and metaphysical representations of the Supreme Court,"
at least if they are taken as "valid descriptions of social life," are "madness."
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FESTISHISM AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 8 (1996).
6 See, e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1050 ("To suggest then that the
law is an aesthetic enterprise can easily seem cavalier, ethically obtuse, even
cruel. We are confronted with the disturbing possibility that law paints its
[violent] order ... on human beings with no more ethical warrant or rational
grounding than an artist who applies paint to canvas."); Pierre Schlag, Anti-
Intellectualism, 16 CARDOzO L. REv. 1111, 1115 (1995) ("The law of judges is
thus given shape, not by a desire to produce insight or understanding, but rather
by that law's desire to hide from itself its own violent and destructive
character.").
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frequent offhand comments that veer close to open normativity.6 1
Schlag also occasionally comes close to identifying himself with
openly political scholarly movements,6 2 and once in a while he
comes tantalizingly close to offering a "should" this or a "should"
that-as when he advises law professors to "stop tr .ng to 'do
law,' or more accurately, stop pretending to 'do law."' 6 Finally, he
Schlag also frequently invokes the "field of pain and death." See Pierre
Schlag, A Reply-The Missing Portion, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1036 (2003)
(quoting Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601
(1986) ("Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.") (footnote
omitted)); see also Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 25, at 1050 (same); Schlag,
Normativity, supra note 22, at 863 n. 168 (same); Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra
note 14, at 187 (same).
61 See, e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1077 ("[I]t is obviously
possible to have intelligent and helpful conversations about the identities of the
players and the stakes."); Pierre Schlag, Jurisprudence Noire, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1733, 1740 (2001) (reviewing LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND: WHAT
LAWYERS REALLY TALK ABOUT WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT LAW (1998))
(observing that Joseph's book "could be taught in a cultural studies or law and
anthropology course," and "this would surely be a good thing."); Schlag,
Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 170 (stating that the "negative point" of
feminist and CLS scholars "is right and important."); id at 190 ("Viewed
dynamically, normative legal thought could conceivably begin to apprehend the
crash [of liberal humanism] and respond."); Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism,
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1115 (1995) (discouraging the "self-identification of
the legal thinker" with "the figure of the judge" because it "may not be terribly
helpful . . . . Indeed, [it] institutes aesthetically, socially, and rhetorically all
manner of assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs constructed to close off inquiry,
constructed to shut down thought.").
In an early effort no doubt reflecting the temperament of youth he
called himself a member of "The Left," though given the passage of years and
his failure to do such things ever after perhaps that can be overlooked. See Pierre
Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A
View From the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919 (1986).
62 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag Politics and Denial, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1136
(2001) (observing that "[fjor those of us on the margins of CLS, it was always a
bit frustrating not to know just what CLS thinkers meant by 'politics.').
Schlag also once concluded an otherwise bombastic but not obviously
political article with a few lines that read like Marxist, Walter Benjamin-esque
critique. See Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 190-91 (arguing that the
training of lawyers in a "liberal humanist" tradition "is a harmless self-
indulgence, except that it provides instrumentalist bureaucracies with an
absolutely marvelous and captivating rhetoric that defines, organizes, routinizes
and services their clientele. It's all really neat. 7-11 sells freedom (which you
can find in their Slurpees). Pepsi brings you the downfall of the Berlin Wall.").
63 Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 427,428 (1997) [hereinafter Schlag, Continuation of God].
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sometimes goes virtually so far as to say, in effect, "the [article]
[book] you are reading is an affirmative social good."6
There are several reasons that for present purposes I will
take all these possible lapses cum grano salis. First, as for Schlag's
sometimes disparaging tone and loose, superficially normative
prose, I believe that he normally does these things coyly and as a
deliberate matter of style. One could also ignore some of these as
moments of incaution in less-serious, presumably less-worked
pieces, and one might observe that Schlag sometimes carefully
couches or equivocates these kinds of statements so as not to cause
internal conflict.65
Other seemingly problematic normative evidence is really
much harder to ignore. First of all, everything in Schlag's writing
betrays an aching desire to explain why this all just feels wrong-
to know why law has "failed to live up to its ambitions"66 -and to
find a different understanding of law that does not. He more or less
explicitly argues as much in his comparison of legal scholarship to
the nineteenth century "pseudo-science" of phrenology. The
purpose of the comparison, he says, is that "something might be
learned by trying to understand how the phrenologists went
wrong."67 His conclusion is that both disciplines share a common
doom by way of his own metaphysical critique. The phrenologists
"had their ontology wrong. The fundamental faculties [which were
hypothesized personality traits thought by the phrenologists to bear
a measurable and predictable quantitative correlation to the size of
6 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 423
(1992) (observing that, if we examine mainstream scholarship in the proper
critical manner, "we might [arrive at] an understanding of what 'law' is and how
'law' maintains itself.").
65 For example, while he advised law professors to "stop pretending to 'do
law,"' he gave this advice only to "those legal academics who find th[e]
prospect" of being forced "to participate in [a] covertly theological discourse" to
be "unappealing." Schlag, Continuation of God, supra note 63, at 428.
Incidentally, there are also certain tics in Schlag's writing that seem
potentially to create internal logic problems, which are not really relevant here.
For instance, he sometimes writes about imaginary or inanimate things as
subjective agencies. "[R]eason," for one, "secrete[s] its own objects and frames
in language and practice," Schlag, Continuation of God, supra note 63, at 439,
and it has an "ambition ... to rule," SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 59, at
81. This to me seems merely playful and unobjectionable. More problematic is
his habit of asserting the absolute nature of problems, which absoluteness he
appears to know only on the basis of a priori speculation. These pronouncements
often take on what seems like an openly theological eschatology, and to that
extent resemble a problem noticed in connection with romanticism, discussed
above. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
6 Schlag, Phrenology, supra note 44, at 886.
67 Id. at 878.
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'cranial prominences'] did not exist. They were not linked to the
size of cranial organs. Further, the cranial organs did not bear any
relation to cranial prominences."6 8 Likewise, the failure of law
results from its "amalgamation of animisms and reifications; of
self-referential complexity, of self-legitimations and folk
beliefs." 69
Another evident purpose that Schlag more or less
acknowledges is to expose intellectual dishonesty, of which he
seems eager simply to make people aware. As mentioned above, he
says that his "project will be successful to the extent it enables the
reader to recognize the various aesthetics of law and their influence
,,70
Schlag has not been unaware of the logical conflicts these
purposes seem to raise, given his own critique of legal
epistemology, metaphysics, and normativity. The only answer he
has been able to offer is of a fairly common type, and for reasons
elaborated below,7 ' it is not especially convincing. He has
acknowledged that work like his "often treads very close to issuing
some normative judgments of its own," but argued that "while the
normative vocabulary and grammar [of mainstream legal
discourse] are no longer an acceptable currency for intellectuals to
use in advancing claims for human beings, there is no other
vocabulary, no other grammar, as of yet." Likewise, he felt it
okay to "recognize[] and embrace[] [the] predicaments and
paradoxes" within his own critique, because the "insist[ence] on
naive rationalist conceptions of coherence, consistency, elegance,
etc., is largely the product of disciplinary hubris and the inertia of
academic bureaucracy."73 Indeed, he continues, to attempt to avoid
the paradox would be wasteful, for "[i]t would beg the exceedingly
interesting question of where the boundaries (if any) of this system
6 1 d. at 886.69Id. at 887.
70 Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1054. One other obvious problem
explained by Schlag's metaphysical critique is that the capaciousness of super-
full objects permits the familiar indeterminacy criticized by CLS, see, e.g.,
KELMAN, supra note 21, at chs. 1-3, which is arguably "bad" for political
reasons. However, Schlag does not seem personally concerned with
indeterminacy and, in the rare instances when he even mentions it, he seems to
offer it mainly as evidence of other, essentially aesthetic problems. See, e.g.,
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 59, at 20-21 (mentioning the CLS
indeterminacy argument apparently as evidence of why mainstream legal
thinkers react defensively to the metaphysical critique).
7 See infra Part IV(7).
72 Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18.
73 id.
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of normative legal thought are located and whether this system can
even be adequately conceptualized as having a determinate or
localizable inside and outside. These are complex and interesting
questions, and I am not about to close them off prematurely simply
because the rationalist aesthetic of traditional legal thought abhors
paradox." 74
In two ways, the fact that Schlag reached this point shows
how closely latter-day legal iconoclasm mirrors the experience of
the Romantics. First, he started with enthusiastic, bombastic,
jubilant critique, and found sympathy throughout the academy (he
remains among the most frequently cited American legal
academics). But second, when pressed, he came up against The
Problem, even though he more than others has avoided political
commitments. Even more telling is that his explicit attempt to
solve it borders on the magical-though there is "no . . .
vocabulary, no . . . grammar, as of yet" in which to explain a
solution, we must "embrace[] ... predicaments and paradoxes," a
defiance that ultimately preserves for us "exceedingly interesting
questions . . . ."
IV. WHAT COULD THE ANSWER BE? OTHER IDEAS THAT DON'T
WORK
Over many, many years, several answers have been offered
to The Problem, and I have come up with some others of my own.
One theme unifies them, which is that they each seem
unsatisfactory for one of two reasons: that is, they fail the test that
was laid out in Part II, above. First, the answer should not conflict
with doubt itself, and it would conflict if it evaded The Problem by
pretending that the initial doubts themselves are just unimportant.
Thus it should not supply an alternative definition of knowledge or
normativity that in itself renders doubt innocuous. It is no help to
the doubter if the answer is to compromise all doubtful insights; he
should not render skepticism impotent simply in order for it to be
logically coherent. Otherwise, he should give up doubt. Second,
the doubter can't be satisfied by answers whose strategy is to
dissociate the purpose of writing from its substance. Thus, a
satisfactory answer would require the writer to care about the
writing, at least in some way.
Therefore, an answer to The Problem is not going to be
compelling unless it does the following: it allows the doubter to
care about the substance of his writing without compromising the
74
232010]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Wash. U. Jurisprudence Rev. 23 2010
24 Jurisprudence Review [March
view that his doubtful insights ever mattered in the first place. 7 It
is here, again, that a key evidence of the affinity with romanticism
becomes clear. In searching for a purpose that seems permissible
under this standard, we will, as did the Romantics, climb a ladder
into ever greater abstraction, eventually reaching outright
mysticism.
I can think of a series of possible answers, but none of them
seem to work. Below is a list of hypothesized purposes that seem
likely, in summary form. They appear in an important order: they
are both in order of increasing compliance with the two conditions
above, and increasing mystical abstraction. They are:
(a) The Truth for Its Own Sake;
(b) Altruism and/or the Second-Best "Market Place of
Ideas" (also known as "Pragmatism");
(c) Pure Aesthetics;
(d) Self-Service and Fame;
(e) Malevolent Self-Service;
(f) Self-Service and Fun;
(g) Infinite Preservation of Absurdity and the Poetry of
the Impossible (also known as the "Always
Already" Trick);
(h) Justification of Existence;
(i) Quasi Buddhism;
(j) Art; and
(k) Complete Revision of Our Job Description.
A. The Truth for Its Own Sake
Most obviously, people might write philosophy because
they want to know the truth. (The reason they seek truth might be a
second purpose, an altruistic one, perhaps; I will consider that
next.) This seems like a pretty bad idea for a doubter. Although the
goal of truth is certainly one that real people pursue in the real
world, and though that class undoubtedly includes some people
sharing the doubter's outlook, I think it is too radically in conflict
with the doubter's resignation to accept as a purpose. Even recast
as mere positive description-law as aspirationally non-normative
social science-work that also endorses any serious doubt will
7 To be clear, I will not consider what any particular writer might actually
desire or intend, since a writer might have a desire or intent that is logically at
odds with his or her own premises. The question is, rather, what should a
hypothesized doubting person, with the two pre-commitments contained in the
test, take as a purpose? See supra Part II.
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conflict with well known and prominent normativity problems
inherent in social theory.76
B. Altruism and/or The Second-Best "Market Place of
Ideas " (also known as "Pragmatism ")
The fact, however, that some (most?) writers believe that
they are seeking the truth suggests another purpose: whether or not
they have any hope of finding the truth, they are seeking it for
someone. For themselves, yes, but since they document their
search in publicly accessible documents, some of them presumably
are seeking truth for others as well-for example, mankind. Thus,
most writers undoubtedly hope that their writings will yield some
benefit for other people, whether it be better policy, a better
understanding of life, or purely a more accurate understanding of
whatever is the question at hand. The double problem is that even
if the goal (justice? superior policy?) were not already quixotic
given the doubter's doubts, The Problem is still implicated. That is,
you may seek a "benefit," but why is it a "good" in the first place?
The doubter's views do not obviously rule out a desire to amuse
other people or make them happy or whatever.7 7 The problem
arises when the doubter tries to serve that good-natured desire
through some means that the doubter's own premises hold to be
impossible.
One quotidian rebuttal is that The Problem itself can simply
be recast in some way so that it does not actually frustrate
normative policy discussion-that is, so that one can both be a
critic of legal doctrine as such and yet still write scholarship with
normative implications. To many people this seems simple,
because it only requires some second-best alternative definition of
"knowledge" that depends on some measure of reliability or
usefulness, rather than certainty, and therefore resembles how we
in fact live our everyday lives. This is also why many people think
doubters are ridiculous. It is implied that the problem is with
skepticism itself, in that it asks too much from reality. "You
skeptics," the argument goes, "allow the perfect to be the enemy of
the good." Another way of saying this, with my apologies to those
who believe I am glossing over important details, is "why can't we
just be pragmatists?"
76 Cf Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics
Movement: Confronting the Problems ofNon-Falsifiability and Normative Bias,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991) (noting a series of such problems inherent
even in would-be non-normative economic theory).
n But see infra Part IV(3).
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I think that this is in fact the way that most of legal
academia now explains itself. Most law professors share some
sense of the metaphysical flabbiness of legal discourse and there is
apparently a common consensus about indeterminacy and the
politicization of law. And yet few law professors would concede
that this means their normative, more or less doctrinal scholarship
is not an affirmative social good. Likewise, I expect that this self-
image actually animated most of legal realism and CLS.7 8 At least
once a person associated, with CLS argued that critique does lead
to utter nihilism, but that nihilism nevertheless does not prohibit
"passionate moral commitments."7 9
My response is that in some sense this rebuttal is right-all
roads really do lead to pragmatism. It is just that pragmatism is
really, really bad, if you want either (1) to preserve a notion of the
"good" with any stability or claim to preservation, or (2) to believe
skepticism is not trivial or irrelevant.
Another strategy within this rubric is to treat
epistemological critique as a matter of academic hygiene-
skepticism does no more than remind you to be vigilant about your
own assumptions and take care to avoid undue pretensions to
truth.80 First, I do not think that this is actually as feasible as it
might seem, as I tried to show in connection with the discussion of
Schlag.8 1 It is actually extremely hard to write without stating or
implying normative propositions logically at odds with skepticism.
78 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 20, at 178, 181-84 (seemingly critical of the
academic "tendency to move above the terrain of political contest," claiming
that "nearly everyone believes that politics can and should be principled in
important respects"; calling generally for a larger "nonconservative" or "left of
center" social program to rival the conservative one currently in action which
allegedly has made law-and-economics successful in worldly respects); Mark G.
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-304 (1984) (alteration in
original).
7 Singer, supra note 15, at 7. As I understand him, Singer argues that
normativity can be reconstructed in the wake of nihilistic critique by a process
of "moral decisions" that are no different than our "everyday moral decisions."
Id. at 62, Singer sets out a short list of rudimentary values he believes should be
discovered through this process, including the prevention of cruelty and misery.
See id. at 67-70.
80 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Epidemiology of Critique, 57 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 475, 485-86 (2003) [hereinafter Fischl, Epidemiology] ("[T]o 'read
Schlag' is to become far more self-conscious about one's participation in the
conventions of legal scholarship," but that merely makes it "impossible to cast
[law] in a role that has it doing all the work . . . without a wink or some other
form of rhetorical distancing.").
8 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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And second, even if it were feasible, it would mean that doubt does
not matter.
C. Pure Aesthetics
Maybe the skeptic can simply say that his purpose is to
expose ugliness or intellectual dishonesty in legal discourse. Such
a purpose seems hard to criticize, and might seem comfortably and
appropriately non-normative. The problem is that there is in fact a
norm. The fact of making the criticism itself implies the value that
it is better to cleanse ugliness and purge dishonesty, and indeed an
honest aesthete would normally have to admit an altruistic motive
as well-the beautification is being done for mankind. Therefore,
if the ugliness or dishonesty to be exposed is the very illogic of
normativity itself or the systematic epistemological or
metaph sical failures in law as such, then The Problem is in full
effect.'
D. Self-Service and Fame
Though I'm sure it would be slightly tref to say it out loud,
some component of most people's desire to write is the desire to
be, alas, famous. This desire in fact could explain a lot of scholarly
effort. Do graduate students in music composition really listen to
Stockhausen, Boulez, or Elliot Carter (gritting their teeth) because
they like it? Do graduate students in women's studies read
Foucault because they want to know the truth? Maybe sometimes,
but often not.83 I think most people who do these things do them in
part because they want to become famous.84
82 One might try to distinguish this argument by saying "yes, but my argument is
not about beauty, it is about understanding the way we think about law." See,
e.g., Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27, at 1051. The problem is that even if a
person intends only that, one must still ask why the person does it, at least if
either the aesthete or the one questioning him also believes in a radically
doubtful critique of law itself. Anyway, I think that the purported aesthete rarely
intends any more than that.
83 I think this explains why young doubters, who might secretly believe in an all-
encompassing and earth-scorching nihilism, can pump out scholarship that is
normative in one way or another, so long as the goal of getting really, really
famous can plausibly be kept afloat. In this way fame does the same existential
work for young legal academics that clients do for practicing lawyers. Contrary
to what script-writers for television lawyer shows evidently imagine, practicing
lawyers seem largely unconcerned as to whether their clients' positions are
"right" or "just" in any transcendental sense. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A lawyer must also act ... with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
84 This is occasionally admitted, though not often by the people seeking the
fame. The late Fred Rodell of Yale said as much of the "studious gents who
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This self-serving motivation is not in itself logically self-
contradictory. I do not think the criticism that is the doubter's
defining trait requires the doubter not to seek fame, even as the
sole purpose of writing. This is so because the mere criterion of
internal coherence does not require any normative outcome,
including "correctness." In itself, it does not require the writer to
prove or accomplish anything related to the content of his work. It
merely requires that the doubtful writer's motives not be in conflict
with other observations the doubter makes-about our epistemic
capacity, the resulting consequences for knowledge and
objectivity, and so on. For what it is worth, I see no reason to
believe that, say, narcissism or ambition are so bad in themselves.
Obviously the self-serving motivation purpose fails the
other criterion of the test in Part II, because it would require the
doubter's purpose to be divorced from his content. Interestingly, if
we stopped here one might say that what I have really done is just
to prove as a matter of logical necessity that the doubter's only
coherent purpose must be some cynical self-service. This is not
good.
E. Malevolent Self-Service
There are other reasons to write that also seem self-serving,
or perhaps other ways to describe this same desire to be famous,
that are also logically permissible from the doubter's perspective.
Maybe the doubter wants to work out frustration because he
resents the world and wants to retaliate in some way. Maybe he is
both weak and angry and can find no other way to soothe his
impotent rage than to strive for the envy of his peers. Maybe he is
like Jean-Batiste Clamence from Camus's The Fall, who tried to
convince the world of its own guilt so that he could be their
superior. s Again, however bad, selfish, or unhealthy these motives
might seem, I think they pose no logical conflict with doubt itself.
diddle around in the law reviews," noting that "the accepted way of getting
ahead in law teaching is to break constantly into print in a dignified way." See
Rodell, Goodbye to Law Review, supra note 18, at 43, 44. A dyspeptic effort to
be as funny as Rodell is Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the
Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REv. 927 (1990) ("To some degree
all of them-whether genuine scholars, would-be wisemen, or coerced clones-
are motivated by the gratification of ego, the satisfaction of habit, and the
expectations of university image-makers."). Also interesting is Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1996). 1 think the
surprising thing is not that anyone has said these things, but that so few have.
8s See generally ALBERT CAMUs, THE FALL (Vintage Reissue ed. 1997). I think,
incidentally, that there is another, quite different reading one could make of The
Fall, and it is one that should be of interest to lawyers. I'm keeping it to myself
28 [March
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Again, not only do self-serving motivations like these
violate one of my criteria, they turn out not to be even very good
descriptions of possible motives for philosophizing. Though
narcissism, ambition, or cruel self-service can perhaps explain
writing produced for other people's consumption, writing does not
account for all of what doubters do. There is no necessary
difference between confronting your intuitions silently or out loud.
Silent activity is at least sometimes not related to the desire to be
famous. The doubter's inner longing is like secret prayer to the
faithful, which seems divorced from its impact on others. So there
is something else going on when the doubter writes, it seems to
me, in addition to any illegitimate motive like a search for truth,
and illogical yet self-serving motives like the desire for fame or
cruelty. In any event, this motive cannot be the one that, for me,
solves The Problem.
It turns out that there is one other self-serving answer that
seems to overcome even these problems. Namely:
F. Self-Service and Fun
This one is harder. There is nothing obviously illogical
about a doubter writing because it is enjoyable. 86 Indeed, writing
because you want to write is not undermined even by the argument
that it implies that writing itself is good, and therefore illogically
makes a positive claim about a value, because, strictly speaking,
writing because you want to has the same rhetorical content as
eating because you want to eat. That is, it has no rhetorical content.
It implies no proposition except that the writer wants something,
and therefore there is nothing to be logically incoherent with
anything else.
It is harder for me to say that this is not the answer (and as I
will explain later, this motive is part of why this paper is a
farewell). The reason it is not ultimately satisfying is that if one is
writing doubt and still having fun with it, one must almost
certainly not care about the inner coherence of the writing.
for now, though, as I don't believe anyone else seems to have thought of it and it
will be the subject of a future paper.
86 Cf Carlson, supra note 17, at 1911 (taking Pierre Schlag to task because "we
need not . .. feel bad because we enjoy reading and writing legal scholarship.").
8 I mean, a tautology is not what a doubter is hoping for at all-all I have said
here is "the doubter writes because he wants to." This pure self-service motive
"legitimates" a doubter's writing when the doubter is not even trying to be right
or to make something he thinks is good. Indeed, it would be the very desire to be
"right" or to make something "good" that would be the problem. The problem
for me, obviously enough, is that my motive is more complex than simple self-
interest, and if I were really convinced that the only intellectually acceptable
292010]
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G. Infinite Preservation of Absurdity and the Poetry of the
Impossible (also known as the "Always Already" Trick)
A sophisticated solution that doubters themselves have
devised is that the apparent paradox of The Problem is okay-that
there is nothing wrong with paradox and that indeed it should be
preserved. Thus, for all I know, maybe this paper itself is wrong by
its nature-maybe looking for the answer is itself the problem.
Camus derided all the "leaps" by which other doubters had avoided
the nihilism implicit in their doubts;88 he thought that any attempt
to resolve the apparently absurd nature of human existence is "[t]o
impoverish that reality whose inhumanity constitutes man's
majesty," and believed therefore that "[i]t is essential to die
unreconciled [because] . . . in that consciousness and in that day-
to-day revolt [absurd man] gives proof of his only truth, which is
defiance." 8 9 Some CLS adherents similarly counsel against the
search for inoculation from The Problem; they say that not only is
it not a virus, it is a good thing.9 0
A slightly different incarnation of the argument in effect
blames the nature of language itself for logical contradictions
inherent in critique of law. That is, it is not the critic's fault that the
only language he can use to criticize law and culture is the very
language of that culture itself. In some people's work this comes
off as pretty shallow and sophistical; as Schlag observed, "[o]ne of
the tricks of some postmodernist writers is to avoid explicitly
making normative statements, knowing full well that the reader
will read the language in a normative way and that, in a pinch, the
reader can always be blamed for having read those 'normative'
judgments into the text."9'
Sometimes this is better handled. I think Schlag has done it
better than others; his version of the argument was already set out
reason for which I could write were cynical or evil, I would stop writing.
Anyway, so far as it matters to me, I think we can safely assume that no one
writes, says, or thinks philosophy solely for cynical or self-serving motives like
fame or envy, without caring about rightness or beauty or other content-related,
value-driven matters. I will not be satisfied until I explain some motive of the
doubter that captures the richness of his feelings when he writes but that is also
legitimate.
88 ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 1, 32-50 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books 1991) (1942).
9 Id. at 55.
9 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 73
(1997); Fischl, Epidemiology, supra note 80, at 479.
91 Schlag, Nowhere to Go, supra note 14, at 174 n.18.
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above. 92 Professor Fischl thoughtfully observed that "[w]e can't
step outside of 'law' and look at it," because when we do so "we
are looking at us."93
A final variation is that the contradiction implied by The
Problem is good because it is a necessary engine of the dialectical
evolution of culture. The argument as I have heard it begins with a
tremendous problem of public relations, in that it relies on
Hegelian metaphysics and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In any case,
the idea is that internal contradiction in law and other normativity
merely evinces dialectical change underway, such that, though they
may never be perfect, law and normativity are always in the
process of "becoming." To hold their inchoate nature against them
would be to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. 94
Incidentally, it appears that Schlag's later work could be
understood as essentially aspiring to a dialectic vision of this
nature, valuing the impossibility of essentials as the motor of
human creativity. 95
My problem with all these views is that however thoughtful
they are, they actually seem to do no more than restate the same
old normativity in fancy language. If preservation of paradox is
good, it must be good for something, and often as not the
something turns out to be the same social values for which
everyone from the center and on to the left has always argued.
Even the Hegelian model seems like just old-fashioned dialectical
materialism, since the "something" it is good for is the
92 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
9 Fischl, The Question, supra note 14, at 802.
94 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1934-35; see also J. M. Balkin, Transcendental
Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1131, 1139, 1176-83
(1994); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology ofDr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 986-88, 1028-
30 (1990); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95
MICH. L. REv. 166, 197-201 (1996). See generally Sagers, supra note 4, at 476-
77.
9 Namely, he appears to have summarized his entire previous critique of the
metaphorical conceptualization of law in Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 27. But
in this work he has implied, arguably in some tension with prior work, that even
when legal culture is seen in the most critical, anti-foundationalist and
decentered mood, in which we experience "identities collapsing and . . .
differentiation falling away," there is something left to be desired. Id. at 1115.
Apparently he endorses our willing embrace of this experience (though he is
fairly non-prescriptive in saying so), so that we can "appreciate law as a creative
enterprise . . . ." Id. at 1115. He says: "to reject this [critical and decentered]
aesthetic as destructive, on the ground, for instance, that it renders law
impossible, is to shut oneself off from an important experience of law and its
creative aspects." Id. at 1094.
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destabilization of illegitimate hierarchies and so on. Professor
Carlson's Lacanian model is harder to fault in itself; but as he
states it, it reads like mere positive description of the human
psychological predicament and therefore fails my other goal,
which is to make doubt matter.
H. Justification of Existence
Sartre adds an interesting perspective. The protagonist of
Nausea, his first novel, 9 6 is Antoine Roquentin, a middle-aged
would-be historian, who at the time of the story has become
disillusioned with life and the quest for meaning, and suffers
pathological loneliness. Roquentin may be no breath of sunshine,
but he provides another and the subtlest yet of the reasons one
might write: as Roquentin says, writing is perhaps no more than a
means to "justify your existence." 97 He decides at the very end that
he can "justify [his] existence," he "might succeed . .. in accepting
[himself]," by writing a novel.
96 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA (Lloyd Alexander trans., 1964) (1938).
9 Id. at 237. Roquentin's crucial revelation is to realize, as a result of his face-
to-face struggle with nothingness, that there are no "adventures." As a young
man, Roquentin traveled the world and had affairs with women-all in the
search, he later realizes, of adventure. Roquentin recalls his frustration one day,
during the course of a love affair, over the fact of his lover's existence. Her
reality-as opposed to the idea of her-spoiled the "adventure" of the affair.
Thus, when she was away from him, his affair with her was a fantasy-he was
finally living what he imagined real life should be. But then she reappeared and
he found himself hating her-because in her real presence "one had to begin
living again and the adventure was fading out." Id. at 56. As he says,
"everything they tell about in books can happen in real life, but not in the same
way." Id. at 54. It was this, then, that by middle age had eroded what Roquentin
had lived for. The promise of meaning latent in culture-which always seemed
just beyond his reach and which kept his life in motion-had turned out to be a
fantasy.
98 Id. at 237-38. He says, imagining how his own existence would be molded by
the fact of having written a book, that
there would be people who would read this book and say:
"Antoine Roquentin wrote it, a red-headed man who hung
around cafes," and they would think about my life . . . as
something precious and almost legendary. [The book at first]
wouldn't stop me from existing or feeling that I exist. But a
time would come when the book would be written, when it
would be behind me, and I think that a little of its clarity might
fall over my past. Then, perhaps, because of it, I could
remember my life without repugnance.
Id. at 238.
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This does not really work for me. First of all, I think Sartre
is just being unduly French in claiming one's existence needs
justification. I for one am pretty content despite complete
agreement with Sartre's conception of the human existential
predicament, and for now at least am troubled only by an evident
logical problem in a scholarly endeavor with which otherwise I am
in love.
Another problem with listening to Roquentin is that Sartre
did not intend the story as advice to the troubled doubter. Indeed,
he viewed Roquentin's new optimism with cruel, subtle irony.
Though it is not at all obvious, and though Sartre gives no other
hint that this is what he intended, Nausea is written as a collection
of journal entries, "found," says the book's fictional Editor's Note,
"among the papers of Antoine Roquentin," 99 suggesting that at
some time after his optimistic renaissance Roquentin killed
himself. Indeed, in nearly his last words in Nausea, Roquentin says
that after his novel is finished he hopes that he will look back on
the moment when he decided to write it and say "[t]hat was . . .
when it all started."100 This is the same way that in his youth he
described the "adventures" of which he dreamed, his many,
invariably hopeless attempts to live the real life he imagined.o10 In
his optimism at the end of the book, Roquentin apparently had
forgotten the critical discovery of nothingness that he recorded
much earlier in his journal.102 This in itself reflects what I tend to
think is the case: writing to justify one's own existence does not
answer The Problem, because it really just begs the same old
normative questions that have been held in abeyance.
I. Quasi Buddhism
An idea that I find more compelling can be found in the
writings of the ancient skeptics. Ancient skepticism is curiously
neglected in modem academia, given the enormous significance it
had in the ancient Mediterranean and in the Rennaissance. 0 3
9 Id. at 6.
'
00 Id. at 2 3 8.
101 See id at 54 ("Now I see so clearly what I wanted. Real beginnings are like a
fanfare of trumpets.").
102 Strictly speaking, I suppose it does not really matter if Sartre meant that
Roquentin was a fool. The question is not the psychological one of how we
should evade despair, but whether it is logically coherent for the doubter to write
to save his own life. One might observe, incidentally, that Sartre himself wrote
not only one, but several novels and other works, almost all of them following
Nausea, and all while living what seems to have been a happy life.
103 See generally RICHARD POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SKEPTICISM: FROM
SAVANAROLA TO BAYLE (2003).
2010] 33
HeinOnline  -- 2 Wash. U. Jurisprudence Rev. 33 2010
Jurisprudence Review
Though it is now seriously studied only by specialist philosophers
and classics scholars, I think most of what is said by
phenomenologists, the existentialists, and other modem doubters
already exists in ancient skepticism. To be precise, I mean the
skepticism attributed to an influential Greek figure of the fourth
century B.C.E. named Pyrrho of Elis, the only significant extant
record of which is found in the writings of a second century C.E.
philosopher named Sextus Empiricus. The skepticism recorded
by Sextus is all encompassing and earth scorching-he argued that
because we seem always incapable of choosing from among any of
the possible judgments we might make, we are left in a state
Sextus calls epoche-that is, suspension of judgment. 0 5
Sextus tells us that the reason the skeptic chooses epoche-
or perhaps more accurately, resigns himself to it or allows it to
overtake him-is to seek tranquility. In his view and allegedly in
that of Pyrrho, the problem in life is our drive to answer questions
affirmatively, a drive that will always be frustrated. Reasoning that
the absence of frustration leaves one in tranquility, the skeptic of
Pyrrho's flavor suspends judgment.' 06 Sextus also seems to have a
pretty good answer for the evident conflict between the doubter's
radically skeptical epistemology and the means by which he must
express it. He says that in "attending to what is apparent, we live in
accordance with everyday observances, without holding
opinions-for we are not able to be utterly inactive." 07 Therefore,
so long as the skeptic avoids holding opinions, he can have a job,
eat, enjoy things, and observe social customs. 08 The observation is
simply that the mere living of life in an ordinary manner does not,
in itself, imply propositions at odds with skepticism.
104 See SEXTUS, supra note 4. That claim is perhaps subject to some dispute
since well known figures in later phases of Plato's academy, notably Carneades
and Clitomachus, also purported that their teachings followed Pyrrho. Sextus
tells us otherwise, see id. at 57-62, and he is nowadays usually taken at his word
in that respect. See BARNES, supra note 4.
05 See id. at 47. Barnes and Annas translate tnoX' as "suspension ofjudgment,"
though it is often merely transliterated to epoche. Cf BARNES, supra note 4, at
8-9.
0 6 See id. at 10-11.
107 SEXTUS, supra note 4, at 9.
108 See id. at 9 ("By nature's guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and
thinking. By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst
to drink. By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an
everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By teaching of kinds
of expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept. And we say all this
without holding any opinions." (footnotes omitted)).
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The problem is that Sextus never explains why one would
not just go the whole way and be a real Buddhist.109 That is,
"tranquility" seems like a plausible defense of doubt in and of
itself, but not of doubtful writing. Indeed, "tranquility" seems not
the likely state of a man who argues a lot, and no one could argue
more than Sextus did."i0 In any case, this essentially Buddhistic
motivation resembles "self-service" and "fun" insofar as it seeks
the internal reward of "tranquility," but it just seems to be incorrect
as an explanation for why one would express doubt publicly."'
J Art
In some sense, maybe the most compelling argument is that
The Problem is actually wrong, because even the doubting law
professor is fully licensed to "do art." The issue might be that The
Problem itself quietly draws a distinction between "philosophy"
and "art." That is, it presumes that "philosophy" exists as a thing
importantly distinct from other things, including art. We normally
do not insist that art defend its own "purpose," and many of us
hold it to no standard of "truth" or "objective goodness."
Therefore, if the art/philosophy distinction is not real, maybe there
is nothing wrong with writing about philosophical matters for the
sake of writing about them, even though they may not attain
logical provability.112
109 The fascinating thing is that there is evidence that Sextus, and Pyrrho before
him, really were Buddhists, after a fashion. Pyrrho was attached to the retinue of
Alexander the Great during his campaign to India, and is alleged by the Roman
historian Diogenes Laertius to have met a group pf the so-called
"gymnosophists," a word often taken to mean Buddhists or other Indian holy
men. The affinity between Pyrrhonian skepticism and ancient Buddhism is so
tantalizing that there seems to be something to this. See 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS,
THE LIVES OF THE EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 475 (R.D. Hicks trans., Loeb
Classical ed. 1995); Richard Stoneman, Naked Philosophers: The Brahmins in
the Alexander Historians and the Alexander Romance, 115 J. HELENISTIC STUD.
99, 104-05 (1995).
110 See SEXTuS, supra note 4, at ix (translator's preface, noting that "the
lifeblood of Sceptical practice ... [is] argument, argument, argument.").
1" If the Buddha really was the Buddha, one imagines he would have been more
like the Siddhartha of Herman Hesse's novel than the mythological Buddha of
even Therevada Buddhism. See HERMAN HESSE, SIDDHARTHA (Bantam Reissue
ed. 1981).
112 I take this to be, for example, Rorty's meaning in his distinction between
"constructive" and "edifying" scholarship. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 357-60 & n.4 (1979). It is also reminiscent of
Alfred Kazin's view that "[w]hat gets us closer to a work of art is not
instruction, but another work of art." ALFRED KAzIN, WRITING WAS
EVERYTHING 7 (1995).
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This again seems hard to reject as wrong; I guess my
response would actually be an aesthetic one rather than a logical
one. If the purpose is the same as the purpose of art, then most
legal philosophy (and certainly anything I can imagine writing)
would look a lot different than it does.' 13
K. Complete Revision of Our Job Description
Finally, maybe the thing to do is just stop being law
professors as traditionally defined. Robert Williams, a self-
identifying "Critical Race Practitioner," urged such a program. It
begins with relinquishment of "warped and twisted forms of
parasitic deviancy plaguing a sick, decaying, and self-absorbed
society," including the law professor's "assigned responsibilities in
life,"-which are, namely, "to fine-tune the workings of capitalism
and the Social-Darwinist state by doing doctrinal scholarship about
the things which . .. enlightened, high-minded fellows . . . care[]
about intensely, like the efficiency of the mailbox rule."114 Such a
catharsis calls for more than "sit[ting] on your ass and
deconstruct[ing] the world with your word processor." Rather,
since one cannot "be a Vampire Law Professor and do Critical
Race Practice at the same time,"' 15 the apotheosis apparently
requires one to stop writing altogether and commit totally to
teaching (including teaching critical theory) and public service.
"[R]eaching more people -different types of people-with the
113 I have heard an argument on occasion that does not belong here exactly, but
that is so delicious that I have to get it in somewhere. A believer might say that
there simply must be some purpose in a writer's mind when the writer sets out to
do "philosophy" that is not at all an artist's purpose, because the work of
philosophers who are self consciously trying to do philosophy is often
unbearable to read. Many philosophers for all appearances exert no effort at all
to make their work enjoyable to read, implying that there must be some purpose
of their philosophy that is not artistic. One could say that this superficial
difference reflects a real underlying difference, which is that philosophy is a
methodological enterprise. That is, philosophy must adopt certain careful
methods of making distinctions and definitions and so on, because it is thereby
that it brings us confidently toward truth. Hence the brain-flattening prose. I
think this argument is pretty simplistic; nothing follows from the fact that a
philosopher has chosen a particular style. The adoption of a rigorous analytical
approach in itselfjust begs a question that the doubter is comfortable answering
in the negative-whether we humans are in a relation to phenomena that allows
us to dissect them in this manner of certainties. What is adorable about it is that
in essence the argument is this: "Chris, your claims must be wrong because so
much of philosophy is really, really awful."
114 Williams, supra note 84, at 757.
I' Id. at 758.
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message, . . . that's what doing Critical Race Practice is all about,
in [Williams'] mind."' 16
I would not say that Williams is wrong, exactly; it is just
that this is not an answer to The Problem. It is a surrender.
I can imagine other purposes like the more subtle ones-
spiritual purposes that do not depend on truth but also are not
wholly divorced from the content of philosophy. They trouble me,
however, and I think that they cannot overcome the sense of their
philosophical incoherence. Roquentin's new life plan, for example,
is one that apparently does not call for him to try to be right about
the world; his purpose really seems like a dramatically stated
desire to be famous. The problem with Sextus, on the other hand,
is that he seems to imply a value. Though the desire for tranquility
is not necessarily related to the truth of his arguments (indeed,
Sextus repeatedly reminds us that the skeptic does not claim that
his beliefs are true, only that they are how the world seems to
him"'), and though desire for tranquility is a self-serving motive
that is hardly one I would feel bad about adopting, tranquility does
not explain why Sextus would write-and it is his argumentative
enterprise that by its nature seems to imply a value.
Anyway, I think that one could continue to screw one's
brain down on this problem, and.continue to read the books upon
books upon books that might shed light on it. But I think it is time
to admit that that will not lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Maybe
religious persons, political progressives, and other heroes generally
are right, and the problem with doubt is merely the absence of
courage to believe. The evident reality remains that there is no
better reason to believe one thing than another. I continue to cling
to my view that skepticism reflects not a lack of courage, but a
greater capacity for critical self-reflection.
V. A CONFESSION AND A FAREWELL
I am pleased to add that making this confession and
farewell fills me with a great and unexpected relief. This is only a
little because it frees me of the sometimes icky politics that seem
to surround gatherings and communities of critical thinkers (and
left politics as well, interestingly enough' 18). Indeed, one reason
"6 Id. at 757.
117 See, e.g., SEXTUS, supra note 4, at 9.
118 Witness the crucifixion of Albert Camus, for example, following his break
with state socialism in the early 1950s. See HERBERT R. LorrMAN, ALBERT
CAMus: A BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1997). The scandal ensued after his publication
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they turn icky is not that we are bad or dishonest people, it seems
to me, but that when The Problem is ignored or assumed out of
existence ours becomes the most naked of emperors. More
importantly, this confession and farewell ends for now the agony
of compulsion to argue over something that everyone seems to
acknowledge has no answer, and the agony of perpetually asking
my own internal, neurotic philosophical task-master for permission
to write about things that are completely fascinating.
This suggests for now an adoption of something like a
Quasi-Buddhism or Self-Service and Fun motivation, and takes
advantage of the only possible sense in which most law professors
resemble professional basketball players: however inconsequential,
wrongheaded or aesthetically misguided the endeavor may be,
producing legal scholarship is nevertheless a craft, which happens
to be of an essentially literary character. It is a craft at which we
excel, and as to which a certain community of our fellow
craftspeople enjoys playing spectator. Thus, an irony that all
skeptics should love is that perhaps the skeptic can succeed only
by going silent about skepticism.
of The Rebel in 1951, where his central thesis was that revolutionary ideology
would, in the hands of succeeding dictatorial powers, devolve to intellectual
formulas and, ultimately, terror. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON
MAN IN REVOLT (Anthony Bower trans., Ist Vintage ed. 1991) (1951). Though
The Rebel was not without friends among the non-communist Left, the book and
Camus were savagely attacked by the communists then dominant among the
French literati, led most notably by Jean-Paul Sartre. See LOTTMAN, supra.
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